While Pearl Harbor was a disaster to the American fleet in 1941, it
could have been much worse. A few years ago while doing research on
the Battle of the Coral Sea for a military history class, I ran across
Samuel Eliot Morrison�s work on the history of the U.S. Navy during
World War II. In his analysis of the Japanese attack, he wondered if
the Japanese hit the wrong targets. He pointed out that the Japanese
failed to hit the fuel depot. The Japanese also failed to hit the
repair facilities. Instead they focused on destroying the battleships
and the planes on the ground.
If memory serves me correctly, I played in my mind what the Japanese
could have done. I told my friend, Tom, the Japanese should have hit
the fuel depot. No fuel. No go. (about three years later, the tour
book OAHU REVEALED by Andrew Doughty and Harriet Friedman on page 105
stated that the Japanese made a similar point). I also read that the
Japanese had good submarines. I reasoned that in addition to knocking
out the fuel depot, they could have used their submarines to intercept
shipping to Hawaii.
Later I ran across a book entitled AND I WAS THERE by Layton. The
author was a U.S. Naval Intelligence officer. The afterward to the
book mentions a Captain Pinneau, who visited with the Japanese after
the war. I believe he told them that they made a mistake and hit the
wrong targets. I believe he had said they should have hit the fuel
depot and used their submarines to intercept shipping to Hawaii, an
idea I had entertained. The Japanese were puzzled at first by Captain
Pinneau�s comments. They responded they that they thought they had
done a good job. The captain asked them when they expected the United
States to mount an offensive against Japan. They responded one year.
Then he asked them when the United States mounted it�s first
offensive. It was actually three month�s after Pearl Harbor. One of
the Japanese smiled wryly and told Captain Pinneau, he should have
been in the Japanese navy. Granted the United States was losing the
war during the first six months. But eventually the tide did turn.
There was supposed to be a third attack on Pearl Harbor knocking out
the repair facilities and other targets. But the Admiral in charge,
fearing an attack by the three American carriers, decided against the
attack. That probably spared the fuel depot. In hindsight, I think
it would have been better to have ignored the �glamour� targets and
focused on the less flashy targets such as the fuel depot and repair
facilities. Because the fuel depot and repair facilities were left
intact, the U.S. Navy was able to power its fleet and repair a number
of the ships sunk at Pearl. It was also providential that the ships
were sunk in the harbor where they could be recovered instead out at
sea in deep water. It wasn�t till the Battle of Midway in 1942 that
the potential of airpower was fully realized. Previous to Midway, both
the Japanese and Americans thought the war would be fought with
battleships. Billy Mitchell, and Franklin Roosevelt (at one time
Secretary of the Navy) clashed over the effectiveness of air power.
The United States was forced after Pearl to build their fleets around
the carrier instead of the battleship. We were fortunate that the
Japanese did not realize the full potential of their aircraft
carriers.
I wonder if the LORD had confused the Japanese allowing them a short
term victory which turned to a defeat in the long run?
# posted by GuyTak @ 8:55 PM
